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CP 1.550. "It may be noticed that, throughout this process, introspection is not resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting the subjective elements of consciousness which cannot be securely inferred from the objective elements."
This obviously has a context but it strikes me as having a sense worth singling out. Does Peirce suggest that objective elements are elements of consciousness or 'material' objects? Regardless of the answer, Peirce clearly suggests there are subjective and objective elements. Bear with me. We have agreed with Peirce that consciousness in its entirety is feeling. If we accept that how can consciousness have subjective and objective elements?
It seems to me that these must be understood as descriptive terms. If I am consciously intending that my computer needs attention and casting about for a solution, the machine is objective and the intent is subjective but the inferential relationship seems to me to have no importance. The feeling is a unity.
All conscious consideration is introspective, I must assume. That is where it takes place. The most objective result of the process that occurs to me is the actual form or presence of the intent. The wedding of my concern to the computer formed into I am gong to have to get Jim over to check this out.
The feeling is the triadic wedding of the computer and getting something done wed to the intent that emerges via the coalescence of mind and heart and its broadcast resulting from the fact of how things happen to be.
I am suggesting that Peirce's sentence contains something of a red herring,
This obviously has a context but it strikes me as having a sense worth singling out. Does Peirce suggest that objective elements are elements of consciousness or 'material' objects? Regardless of the answer, Peirce clearly suggests there are subjective and objective elements. Bear with me. We have agreed with Peirce that consciousness in its entirety is feeling. If we accept that how can consciousness have subjective and objective elements?
It seems to me that these must be understood as descriptive terms. If I am consciously intending that my computer needs attention and casting about for a solution, the machine is objective and the intent is subjective but the inferential relationship seems to me to have no importance. The feeling is a unity.
All conscious consideration is introspective, I must assume. That is where it takes place. The most objective result of the process that occurs to me is the actual form or presence of the intent. The wedding of my concern to the computer formed into I am gong to have to get Jim over to check this out.
The feeling is the triadic wedding of the computer and getting something done wed to the intent that emerges via the coalescence of mind and heart and its broadcast resulting from the fact of how things happen to be.
I am suggesting that Peirce's sentence contains something of a red herring,
