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CP 1.250. The dependence of the psychical sciences upon philosophy is no less manifest. A few years ago, indeed, regenerate psychology, in the flush of her first success, not very wisely proposed to do without metaphysics; but I think that today psychologists generally perceive the impossibility of such a thing. It is true that the psychical sciences are not quite so dependent upon metaphysics as are the physical sciences; but, by way of compensation, they must lean more upon logic. The mind works by final causation, and final causation is logical causation. END
Causation will forever elude science and science will forever seek causes. But this is actually a sort of intellectual power play. Peirce makes clear that psychic matters are in the realm of causation, generals, metaphysics, and from the perspective of its critics, speculation.
We cannot have a viable intellectual environment when binary approaches are standard and dualist conclusions are rife. Those who arrive at purely metaphysical conclusions, poets, novelists, essayists, etc, may wrongly claim they speak universal truths. Peirce had the wisdom to suggest that for a truth to be universal it requires an integration of science and metaphysics.
Today it is painfully obvious that there are yawning chasms of possibly measurable events that are not subject to scientific investigation that are avoided for reasons that logically suggests avoidance and denial.
Without dwelling on this, we should remember Pierce's incredible sense of his own project. To leave a fund of assertions that would surpass Aristotle's declension of matters.
Causation will forever elude science and science will forever seek causes. But this is actually a sort of intellectual power play. Peirce makes clear that psychic matters are in the realm of causation, generals, metaphysics, and from the perspective of its critics, speculation.
We cannot have a viable intellectual environment when binary approaches are standard and dualist conclusions are rife. Those who arrive at purely metaphysical conclusions, poets, novelists, essayists, etc, may wrongly claim they speak universal truths. Peirce had the wisdom to suggest that for a truth to be universal it requires an integration of science and metaphysics.
Today it is painfully obvious that there are yawning chasms of possibly measurable events that are not subject to scientific investigation that are avoided for reasons that logically suggests avoidance and denial.
Without dwelling on this, we should remember Pierce's incredible sense of his own project. To leave a fund of assertions that would surpass Aristotle's declension of matters.
