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Peirce: CP 1.170 Cross-Ref:††
170. Equally conclusive and direct reason for thinking that space and degrees of quality and other things are continuous is to be found as for believing time to be so. Yet, the reality of continuity once admitted, reasons are there, divers reasons, some positive, others only formal, yet not contemptible, for admitting the continuity of all things. I am making a bore of myself and won't bother you with any full statement of these reasons, but will just indicate the nature of a few of them. Among formal reasons, there are such as these, that it is easier to reason about continuity than about discontinuity, so that it is a convenient assumption. Also, in case of ignorance it is best to adopt the hypothesis which leaves open the greatest field of possibility; now a continuum is merely a discontinuous series with additional possibilities. Among positive reasons, we have that apparent analogy between time and space, between time and degree, and so on. There are various other positive reasons, but the weightiest consideration appears to me to be this: How can one mind act upon another mind? How can one particle of matter act upon another at a distance from it? The nominalists tell us this is an ultimate fact -- it cannot be explained. Now, if this were meant in [a] merely practical sense, if it were only meant that we know that one thing does act on another but that how it takes place we cannot very well tell, up to date, I should have nothing to say, except to applaud the moderation and good logic of the statement. But this is not what is meant; what is meant is that we come up, bump against actions absolutely unintelligible and inexplicable, where human inquiries have to stop. Now that is a mere theory, and nothing can justify a theory except its explaining observed facts. It is a poor kind of theory which in place of performing this, the sole legitimate function of a theory, merely supposes the facts to be inexplicable. It is one of the peculiarities of nominalism that it is continually supposing things to be absolutely inexplicable. That blocks the road of inquiry. But if we adopt the theory of continuity we escape this illogical situation. We may then say that one portion of mind acts upon another, because it is in a measure immediately present to that other; just as we suppose that the infinitesimally past is in a measure present. And in like manner we may suppose that one portion of matter acts upon another because it is in a measure in the same place. END
Peirce pierces nominalism at every turn. But he is stubbornly clear about why. No conclusion that closes off inquiry can be accepted. Hence continuity is not at odds with the assumptions that will be revealed when quantum physics emerges toward the end of his life. Non locality and entanglement, for example.
Peirce does not question everything as a matter of rote habit. He accepts at least as fallible suppositions truths that have withstood the test of experimentation and consensus regarding results.
On issues like climate change, Peirce would probably suggest that there are possibilities that might put an entirely different slant on current dire assumptions about the inevitable. Science renders nothing inevitable.
What he would surely skewer is the state of debate in which binary forces simply butt up against each other and enlightenment suffers.
Peirce knew that consciousness existed and that it suggested explanations for how thoughts can travel. Even to write in this realm of discourse is to place him among the realm of the triadic and the remainder of his philosophy makes this identity not merely clear but foundational.
And when the mysteries of quantum are resolved I hazard a guess that the result will be, as Peirce suggests, measurable. As is everything else.
170. Equally conclusive and direct reason for thinking that space and degrees of quality and other things are continuous is to be found as for believing time to be so. Yet, the reality of continuity once admitted, reasons are there, divers reasons, some positive, others only formal, yet not contemptible, for admitting the continuity of all things. I am making a bore of myself and won't bother you with any full statement of these reasons, but will just indicate the nature of a few of them. Among formal reasons, there are such as these, that it is easier to reason about continuity than about discontinuity, so that it is a convenient assumption. Also, in case of ignorance it is best to adopt the hypothesis which leaves open the greatest field of possibility; now a continuum is merely a discontinuous series with additional possibilities. Among positive reasons, we have that apparent analogy between time and space, between time and degree, and so on. There are various other positive reasons, but the weightiest consideration appears to me to be this: How can one mind act upon another mind? How can one particle of matter act upon another at a distance from it? The nominalists tell us this is an ultimate fact -- it cannot be explained. Now, if this were meant in [a] merely practical sense, if it were only meant that we know that one thing does act on another but that how it takes place we cannot very well tell, up to date, I should have nothing to say, except to applaud the moderation and good logic of the statement. But this is not what is meant; what is meant is that we come up, bump against actions absolutely unintelligible and inexplicable, where human inquiries have to stop. Now that is a mere theory, and nothing can justify a theory except its explaining observed facts. It is a poor kind of theory which in place of performing this, the sole legitimate function of a theory, merely supposes the facts to be inexplicable. It is one of the peculiarities of nominalism that it is continually supposing things to be absolutely inexplicable. That blocks the road of inquiry. But if we adopt the theory of continuity we escape this illogical situation. We may then say that one portion of mind acts upon another, because it is in a measure immediately present to that other; just as we suppose that the infinitesimally past is in a measure present. And in like manner we may suppose that one portion of matter acts upon another because it is in a measure in the same place. END
Peirce pierces nominalism at every turn. But he is stubbornly clear about why. No conclusion that closes off inquiry can be accepted. Hence continuity is not at odds with the assumptions that will be revealed when quantum physics emerges toward the end of his life. Non locality and entanglement, for example.
Peirce does not question everything as a matter of rote habit. He accepts at least as fallible suppositions truths that have withstood the test of experimentation and consensus regarding results.
On issues like climate change, Peirce would probably suggest that there are possibilities that might put an entirely different slant on current dire assumptions about the inevitable. Science renders nothing inevitable.
What he would surely skewer is the state of debate in which binary forces simply butt up against each other and enlightenment suffers.
Peirce knew that consciousness existed and that it suggested explanations for how thoughts can travel. Even to write in this realm of discourse is to place him among the realm of the triadic and the remainder of his philosophy makes this identity not merely clear but foundational.
And when the mysteries of quantum are resolved I hazard a guess that the result will be, as Peirce suggests, measurable. As is everything else.
